“There was not an epicentre of the electoral earthquake, but an origin: Federal Capital. Nevertheless, it was not there where he obtained his broadest magnitude this Sunday, but in the replicas in the provinces. Contrary to what was thought, it was a vote of the interior (…) “He prevailed in the popular areas of Gran Buenos Aires (GBA, with its initials in Spanish) and the provinces. The eye-catching are the provinces: Mendoza, San Juan, San Luis” (La Nación, Federico González del Solar, 8/15/23)

In this first text, we want to focus in the most objective; we think that it is the most important to focus on that. About the left, what we are most interested in this text is its political balance, not so much comparative data that will be included in other texts. Even though, we start from the point that the election of the left was very weak in general. That does not take away that our party made a historic electoral campaign that goes beyond the lean results in votes (although the proportions with the rest are not bad) and that further our current scope connects us with the coming battles: war classes has been stated.

For all the definitions we make, however we need to take into consideration that these are the elections PASO, that there is some time left to October and eventually, November. Many things could change beyond that in the immediate a new juncture opens that needs to be explained and achieve consent for action, as well as intelligently establish a dialogue with the exploited and oppressed society.

Anyways, in this writing we will make the thicker stroke definitions about the election, about the meaning of Milei, the inedita vote in Argentine to this character of extreme right, some annotations about the immediate juncture and the political balance of the left and the party. All these definitions will be collectively debated in the part and the vanguard to achieve more pressure and finess in the policy and the orientation.

1. Meaning of the electoral irruption of Milei

The first definition is that this person has the possibility of going to the second round and even winning it. It is considered that way by the arithmetic of the votes. It will be seen if and how the class struggle breaks into the middle, to turn the panorama. If we add the 31 points of Milei and the 17 of Bullrich, they reach almost 50%. This fact, if it were to materialize, although it is not sure it will, it would be a declaration of war on the Argentine Working Class, even if the working class is not be fully aware of this at the beginning of that experience if it occurs (it should be noted that we are doing this report on the way, that reactions and debated started to occur in the workplaces in relation to those who voted for Milei.

A government of Milei in Argentina would be almost in contradiction with real power and class relations that still operate in the country. The second definition is that we must remember that in Brazil, there was a political prosecution before Bolsonaro came to power in 2018. There were right-wing mobilizations in 2015 and 2016. Do not forget how the progressive days of 2013 against the government of Dilma Rousseff ended turning to the right, the anti-politics; then came the parliamentary coup that ousted Dilma. The PT (with its initials in Spanish, it means Workers Party) betrayed and did nothing. There was betrayal of Lula who presented himself with justice to go to jail (when doing it, he said “I trust in justice”^[1]). There was the government of Michael Temer with the labor and pension counter-reforms.

In other words, there was a sequence of defeats and not only of electoral events that made that some Brazilian Marxists claim that Brazil was undergoing a deeply reactionary “icy” stage. In that more general and not only general context Bolsonaro came to government. In other words, after all that inner processing. Bolsonaro was rather a result of all that process than his first movement.

In Argentina, Milei is a more purely electoral phenomenon, by now, even though it deals with the balance of Kirchnerismo ^[2]: the failure of progressivism (for Brazil it would be “reformism with no reforms”). Also, and that is more serious, with the weakness of the Argentinazo ^[3] (its limits in relation to the more concentrated of the working class, where it did not impact beyond the process of recomposition of the worker vanguard characterized by fights and defeats, Kraft, Gestamp and Lear) and likewise for fights and defeats (more or less reabsorbed by the classist point of view) such as the tyre.

However, it does not deal only about Argentinazo. The election result of Milei deals with a provocation against the structure itself of the Argentine worker movement who was not destroyed even by the military dictatorship. (Objectively, the subjective motivations of voting are different, but it is indeed a reactionary vote). Even the dictatorship (with its 30.000 missing people) could destroy the unions despite the sinister role played by the trade union bureaucracy throughout all the stage.

Milei is not Menem. Milei threatens to be deeper and more reactionary. Logically, he should win the election and impose his threatens, and all that is not written at all.

Menem’s government was an “economic” attack as well as against the unions. Of course, in addition, it pardoned the military. It was reactionary, but it was the reaction of a traditional Peronist character (with other social bonds, too). Milei is another thing: he is a character of the extreme right who could reach the presidency via the regime of 1983 (via the bourgeois democracy, something inedita in the country). ^[4]

An attack to all the conditions of the working class? Well, it would like to see them. Although the Peronist union bureaucracy is perfidious, from ultra-right wing, so genuflex that kneels and traitor as the Brazilian, it remains to be seen whether the working class, sensing the danger and the attack, passes it over. Surely, there would be moments of unit of action and united front but in all cases, we will have to be careful, although without any sectarianism, of eating any trick that would do one thing but do another.

It is also real that the apparatus of the Argentine bureaucracy is stronger than the apparatus of the Brazilian union bureaucracy (another thing is the political apparatus of the PT in which we are not interested for the purpose of this writing). Argentine Peronist bureaucracy has self-interests, and in that sense, it is as well a “political” structure, and not only a union space. In the 90’s, most of the fat, bureaucracy of CGT (General Workers Union with its initials in Spanish. The fats are called that way by the working class) lined up with Menem without hesitation (MTA, CTA and CCC called for some measurements, although inconsistent. What destabilized everything was the irruption of the mass and piqueteros who were independent from the government at that time)^[6] (Piqueteros are unemployed workers who receive social assistance from the state. These aids are administered by social movements. They have a relevant capacity of defence against the intentions to remove the aids). But Menem did not attack the itself structure of the unions, contrary to what Milei threatens to do.

Besides, there is another central problem to the coming perspectives: Milei’s bump is from the interior provinces (which are more conservative and traditional) and in Argentina political issues are “cooked” in the centre since the fall of the dictatorship (in the 70’s, the irradiation fact was from Córdoba. Since the fall of the dictatorship the irradiation fact is from the centre of the country). That is an important geographic-strategic difference with Brazil, for instance, which is a decentralized continent country with several centers and where its capital, Brasilia, is isolated for 2000 kilometers from the main centers: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre (that is called the «southern triangle»).^[7] Milei gets 17% in Capital and 25% in Buenos Aires province. It is classic in the revolutions and counter-revolutions that the interior delays; or that goes further to the right than the political center (in case of more «normal» situations). The German Revolution of 1919 failed because it could not drag the country, as could the Paris Commune in 1871. The success of the Russian Revolution of 1917 is because it dragged the country, and the success of the French Revolution was because it dragged the peasantry (in both cases they gave the land to the peasantry). ^[8]

Milei did not win the centre of the country. That is an objective fact (it is not pure analysis). That vote for Milei reflects a certain loss of class compass. But we must see its composition well: how much there is of the workers’ vote, not plebeian or precarious (the composition of the vote for Milei must be discussed calmly and deeply within the left and the party, it is not an essentially workers’ vote but a plebeian one in addition to the reactionary middle class of the interior and of the young men who react to the conquests of the women’s movement and the rupture of traditional relations between men, women, the LGBT community, etc.).

All similar phenomena: Bolsonaro, Vox, the Front National are not, essentially, workers’ vote; the workers’ vote was basically for Massa, at least in GBA (we are not clear what happened in Córdoba although it must have gone to Schiaretti). Milei’s vote is nourished by elements of declassification, of small owners, also of precarious workers or some very questioned by things such as the repudiation of the plans, machismo, the leaders of Peronism, etc. It is also the vote of sectors of the resentful and even wealthy middle class as we have already pointed out. It is quite «transversal» in that sense but it is not, essentially, a vote of the working class or of the more or less educated youth, nor of women, logically.

Milei has another problem (this one more organic, more structural, at least so far): he does not have support from the armed forces as Bolsonaro had. There may be sympathy among the Argentine Armed Forces for Milei, but what we are saying is that the Argentine Armed Forces do not have today – at least until now – the place they have in Brazil; nor does it have it from Pentecostal churches (at least, so far). What does he have? Is this how he will go to war against the Argentine working class?

Logically all this can change. We must not make, either, any definition that relativizes things although, we insist, we must not be impressed either. We do not yet know what the bourgeoisie will decide. For example, with the International Monetary Fund he has to establish a relationship; so far he has dedicated himself to denouncing it and affirming that if he reached the government he would make «a much stronger adjustment than that of the IMF.»

However, without a doubt, with what he has, for example the support of Macri and Bullrich, he will go to war if he wins the runoff. Attention: we must not underestimate the phenomenon and the danger it represents, in addition to the fact that he undoubtedly carries legitimacy due to the collapse of progressivism. Milei openly criticizes the concept of «social justice». He defends social egoism, an idea of the arsenal of «entrepreneurship» à la Bolsonaro (the self-made man of the free market). ^[9] How much legitimacy he can generate, we don’t know yet.

Nor if he will win the elections, although it is true that some people from his social base feel «empowered» and it is not the time to fall into provocations. We must let a few days pass and pass a little the mist of smog that left his vote and organize the reaction from the patient explanation of the phenomenon, its scope and limits. But we repeat that it is also true that if he is imposed electorally, there are reservations in the working class: he will go to a class war without a doubt! This is a materialist analysis of the balance of forces, especially in the center of the country.

But we repeat that it is also true that if he is imposed electorally, there are reservations in the working class: he will go to a class war without a doubt! This is a materialist analysis of the balance of forces, especially in the center of the country. Logically, none of this denies the significance of their vote with 31%. In that sense the «balance» is brutal, we must be clear on that (its vote is a shock). Because, in addition, it is a reaffirmation of capitalism against progressive whims; it is a reaffirmation of the rules of the market; of the empire of private property.

It is something deep: in the midst of a global questioning of capitalism the types reaffirm themselves (hence their highly reactionary and even counterrevolutionary content in some aspects, although attention that they are still an electoral political phenomenon; they do not have great «shock forces»)[10]. At the international level there are two phenomena: «progressivism» is very bad but there is a phenomenon of questioning capitalism, especially in the youth (new precarious working class type delivery people, youth, ecology, women, national self-determination movement, etc.). And there is the explicit reactionary affirmation of capitalism which is what Trump, Bolsonaro, Netanyahu, among others express. It is not a coincidence that Milei singles out Israel among his potential international allies, and claims that if he wins the election he will move the Argentine embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in an open provocation to the Palestinian people.

This reactionary reaffirmation of capitalism is what got 30% of the votes (plus 17% for Bullrich); it is too much to underestimate. The National Front in France (Rassemblement National) never passed 25% in the first round. In the second round it did reach 40%, but the floor from which it starts for a runoff is not less.

So the scenario is that: it is serious, although it is not closed at all! If we say it’s not serious, we’re idiots. But we are not going to be scared because there are reservations in the working class. Because it is a declaration of war without prior processing. Because of one more phenomenon from the interior that presses on the center, but, precisely, the political center of the country is not so far to the right. And, for the rest, because it expresses another social structure: even with degradation and everything there are undoubtedly reservations in the working class, in its most concentrated portions, and that will have to be faced by an eventual government of Milei or Bullrich or a coalition between them.

This reactionary reaffirmation of capitalism is what got 30% of the votes (plus 17% for Bullrich); it is too much to underestimate. The Front National in France (Rassemblement National) never passed 25% in the first round. In the second round it did reach 40%, but the floor from which it starts for a runoff is not less.

So the scenario is that: it is serious, although it is not closed at all! If we say it is not serious, we are idiots. But we are not going to be scared since there are strengths in the working class because it is a declaration of war without prior processing. Another reason not to be scared is that it is one more phenomenon from the interior that presses on the center, but, precisely, the political center of the country is not so far to the right. And, for the rest, as it expresses another social structure: even with degradation and everything there are undoubtedly reservations in the working class, in its most concentrated portions, and that will have to be faced by an eventual government of Milei or Bullrich or a coalition between them.

2. We must know not to capitulate to the pressures of the regime

The other complexity is that we do not know if the bourgeoisie wants Milei president. It is not clear from what has been said, because it is a provocation; even an adventure you could say. Another thing, as they have been doing, is to use it as a battering ram, but sometimes the role of sorcerer’s apprentices is fulfilled …

But, it was not clear that the Brazilian bourgeoisie wanted Bolsonaro as president, and he was. The center and center-right parties collapsed, only the PT survived. Here, too, they did not collapse; Peronism did not collapse, nobody collapsed completely (the system of parties by thirds and coalitions in a way, work even though Milei escaped them). There is, yes, a very strong electoral setback of Peronism (it lost six million votes in relation to 2019) and, in addition, a resounding failure of Juntos so far to appear as an option.

Going to the role of the revolutionary left it is a fact that the party remained to the left of the «lines of development» throughout the electoral campaign, and especially in the last week, when the pressures of the regime became fierce with the campaign for Morena, the murder of Molares in the middle of the Obelisk on Thursday 10/08 at the end of the electoral campaign, and the line of «lifting the electoral closures» to impact on the right on the elections of Sunday 13. Our party^[11] was the only current of the revolutionary left that did not give in to that brutal offensive of throwing itself with dead in the middle of the electoral campaign, at its peak, that made anti-electoral decisions at the close of the campaign, that preferred expressly not to go to the closing in TN (recognized news in Argentina) so as not to expose Manu and not lift its walk of electoral closure. We maneuvered politically so as not to eat the bear hug of the regime, and that is why -finally- we made an anti-electoral closure in the middle of the electoral campaign (hierarchizing not to give in to pressure even if that could have a cost in electoral matters, votes).

To make matters worse, the PTS (Party of Socialist Workers with its initials in Spanish), which was the first of the left to lift its closure (the PO also lifted it) spent all day on Sunday 13 criticizing the electronic ballot to see if it won one more vote… An anti-principled shame when the problem is not the type of ballot but the electoral regime. ^[12]

The PTS made a show all day against the electronic ballot (we insist, something hyper-tactical) because it knew that it lost the internal one in CABA with the PO, that it lost it anyway instead of holding a class and independent line, like us, because the issue, in short, we repeat, is not the type of ballot but the proscriptive electoral regime (which is something much deeper and a distortion of the electoral rules of the game because it proscribes voices in the election that really counts, which is the one in October).

In any case, the thing came from further back: from the character of our electoral campaign which, in a sense, was the only really class electoral campaign (around 500,000 and the anti-capitalist measures in the face of the crisis). The PO campaign was luchist and populist but it could not be said that it was «classist». And the campaign of the PTS was undoubtedly electoralist. They yielded in all the line to the pressures of the regime desperate to win the internal one (a party cannot play the roulette wheel of the elections, although we must learn to measure with them in a non-sectarian way which we recognize is not easy).^[13] But there are criteria of principle and issues that, Obviously, they go beyond the electoral: it cannot be that everything is done in order to win one more vote… We repeat. We are not a sectarian current and we are against any anti-electoral childish leftist idea. But this time when the regime turns to the right and it is the regime itself that kills and questions democratic freedoms, when the regime itself throws you a «bear hug» with the reactionary proposal that «everything stops» because they arrange it that way, you had to make a gesture and make an anti-electoral(ist) closure.

The last week of the elections there was a lot of vertigo because we have a youth party, an extraordinary candidacy in the person of Manuela Castañeira very installed, with a lot of exposure, an immense scissors with the organic of the party, and then we had to know how to act well, take care of Manu and, at the same time, not give up the line of principles in the face of the pressures of the regime.

And even so, and all the elements of adaptation of the FITU, the left as a whole made a bad choice. Logically, in a context so far to the right and running alone, we could not break the «barrier of coalitions». That is, to grab votes that FITU lost or even capitalize on the immense campaign we did. We insist a thousand times: it would be a very serious mistake to draw sectarian conclusions. The battles must be fought and the only globality that exists from the political point of view internationally today and not only in Argentina, under this bourgeois-democratic regime (which must be defended even unconditionally against the Bonapartist blows by the right as we did extraordinarily when we marched for democratic freedoms the day after the attack on Cristina Kirchner, September 2, 2022), are the elections themselves – like it or not, it is not about our tastes but about reality. ^[14]

But, then, the electoral pressure is so fierce that it can drag you not to the fair, necessary and essential electoral campaign, to the dialogue with broad sectors as pedagogically Manuela does almost without rival on the left and they have to start to make the rest of our party figures (although each with its own personality), to concentrate all the forces in the elections when elections are what there are and anything else would be childish. But drag yourself in front of electoralism yielding in the «line of principles» against the political regime as was the cunning and reactionary move of the lifting of the electoral closures. You can’t as a revolutionary left adapt to that; There are things that even if people don’t understand it, you can’t do it. We even explained that we preferred a face-to-face and active electoral closure to repudiate the murder of Morena and embrace his family.

One issue is electoral participation attentive to the laws of an electoral campaign (I repeat that it would be a childish political crime not to know what is won in the party), and another is to give in to electoralism. What is electoralism? When you go over mambo, when what orders your whole «life» is how many votes you get (the electoral result itself measured only in votes, although the votes that are taken are not at all minor). Even your activity, I correct myself: because in electoral campaign the central activity is to make the electoral campaign. But getting votes is still a means to an end. And if due to electoral pressures you give in to the line of principles, you lose everything (electoral and extra-electoral).

That is what is being seen in the desperation of the PTS to order all relations on the left by electoral means, in which it is seen as «apparatus» at the top and little militancy at the bottom. That is what broke an immense but headless structure by the death of Nahuel Moreno, like the old MAS (Movimiento al Socialism with its initials of Spanish. It means Movement to Socialism). That is, in short, what broke the PO when it lost the internal with the PTS. This is what could break the FITU itself, which came out very battered from the PASO with accusations such as racism. (FIT-U) Left and Workers’ Front-Unity is an Argentine left-wing electoral coalition.  (The old MAS was a huge structure but it was lost because Moreno died without a replacement to match, in addition to the fact that the programmatic bases and misconception, objectivists, totally disarmed it. And the structure does not command, the apparatus does not command: it commands the policy, the principles and the conception, that is what keeps you firm. The old MAS ran out of that and went to hell, for electoral and union reasons too.)

Let us now stop at the accusation of «racism» from the PO to the PTS: it is a very serious accusation. It is talking about principles. It is like accusing the other of being a cop or homophobic. It is true that the FITU remains, although degraded, a united front of class independence. But it is not only that, let us remember: it had at times characteristics of a «revolutionary united front» if the PTS would not have called several times to the PO to form a «single party of the left»…

Now, without us being in the presence of a revolutionary united front or a single party (of which, moreover, we are against: it seems to us a Stalinist statement although we are completely in favor, when the conditions are, of converging with other revolutionaries^[15])), in any case the FITU is not only a front of class independence. It is for a single point: it is something more than that and it degrades the entire left principledly, that they are accused of being «racist», all unprincipled criteria because, in addition, they are made in off as if only the FITU existed as an auditorium and internal struggle in the FITU, and not the entire working class and youth and the women’s movement, our class, with which we relate, which we intend to help orient oneself. It is unthinkable that our parties and fronts, whether of struggle or electoral, could be outside our class.

This is another element of adaptation: you say anything and life goes on as if it were such a thing… Because they want to sell themselves without principles in exchange for something, in this case votes. Both the PO and the PTS threatened during these PASO to «break the FITU» but there they are all «together and scrambled». And attention: we were never and are never – now not in the middle of this turn to the right – in favor of the rupture of FITU. We always defended our integration to the front in dignified conditions or a PASO of the entire left in even came in this election to propose a common formula of Manuela with Bregman. In any case, we always propose, in each election, some «formula of unity» that contains us and that we can independently develop our policy (as it should be, it is the minimum floor of any united front, not to tie the hands of others!). We did that from 2011 until this election as well. But another thing is something that has nothing to do with the New MAS and our action: we criticize Bregman for refusing unity, because he «ignored» us to the proposal of unity… but the PO and the PTS discuss «racism». Raising racism without any consequence is one of two things: a) either this accusation against principles is withdrawn, b) or the FITU is broken. If none of the things happen, it is weird to say the least…

Coming back to our central argument, we take advantage of the day of Sunday 13 to claim the right to protest. And to say that the right to vote exists in Argentina because the military dictatorship was brought down with popular mobilization (not to claim the paper vote against electronic voting …).

With the result of the PASO set and the dangers that loom in the class struggle, our «anti-electoralist» gestures last week and Sunday 13^th itself look like a valuable principled test against the rest of the left (the PO also lifted its closure). Ahead, the right to protest, struggle and organization of the working class and youth and the women’s movement is the main one that sustains everything else; that prepares us for the class war that is coming in Argentina although the result of October and the runoff is not set and a lot of water can still run in the stream (it can still be reversed from the places of work and study, the streets and the organization).

3. The task of the moment is to explain and measure each step to organize the exit to the streets

The PASO opened a new conjuncture, a reactionary smog that may dissipate sooner rather than later (we will see it in the experience). The government of the FdT (Frente de Todos, ruling coalition) has just validated a devaluation: they do the work to the IMF, the employers and the coming government (whatever comes). They are just another variant of capitalist adjustment. That is why we went out on Monday the 14^th raising the rejection of the devaluation, the rejection of the working class paying the cost of the crisis and pointing out that we must take stock and organize the exit to the streets to face the ongoing adjustment, the rightist danger and, also, clear the reactionary smog left by the historic vote of Milei.

Besides, we raise the demand for an active general strike because although the bureaucracy is perfidious there is no other expression today of the need for the working class to emerge as a class, to recognize its social strength at the moment when it is impacted by the vote for Milei.

Logically, a reaction slowly begins at the bottom. We must accompany this experience, patiently dialogue the balance sheet and prepare the exit to the streets but with dialogue with society, but not in a hasty and erratic way. Those who did not vote for Milei (who are the majority), are taking their toll on Milei’s supporters. ^[16]

The immediate conjuncture has a reactionary whiff and the task of the party is not to go out and invent anything but to do what is specific to a revolutionary party: to go out, explain and discuss the electoral balance as well as the perspectives of the coming class war without entering into provocation or haste.

We must make open meetings, share our balance and perspectives, arm the vanguard against defeatism and be attentive to any manifestation of struggle, resistance and organization against the adjustment of the government, the IMF and the extreme right of Milei and Bullrich. It is also very likely that all the opportunities of united front as when Macri won corrected and increased, but, logically, one thing are demonstrations of struggle and another to fall into the tricky campaign of the vote for Massa in October (a specific effort must be made to separate the chaff from the wheat).

They are two different ways: we are calling to «not wait for October and November», to understand, organize and go out to fight when we generate the conditions and try to turn the situation around. Something similar happened in Brazil narrowly with the women’s movement in October 2018 before Bolsonaro’s election with the Nao #Elle, but it was not enough because the PT and the CUT tied the hands and feet of the working class. The PT had a record of betrayal records all these years!

Well, although the party obviously cannot solve it on its own, «although it would be ridiculous to go out alone to the clash…. (We must avoid by all means falling into any slightest provocation!). The orientation is precisely that: push for the clarification and exit to the struggle of the working class, youth and the women’s movement in dialogue with society to stop the adjustment and the reactionary wave in its tracks!

But for that we must pass the balance first and help to understand and prepare the militancy, the rest of the left, even the people of the base of Kirchnerismo who are honest, the vanguard and the working class to face the adjustment, the reaction from Milei and Bullrich and, even, prepare ourselves for the class war that surely comes in any scenario.

^[1] We remember that our international current and SOB Brazil were against Lula’s surrender to justice. We were in the Union of Metallurgical Workers of Sao Bernardo where Lula was a refugee and then we left repudiating his presentation to justice. Other currents of the Brazilian Trotskyist left wing supported Lula’s presentation to the bourgeois justice. That is another example how the regime of the bourgeois democracy presses the revolutionary left and how it is different to defend the democratic rights of the reactionary hits than to get involved in the pressure of the bourgeois regime.

^[3] Popular rebellion burst in 2001. It opened a political crisis and promoted the mass movement for coming years.

^[4] Programs such as the one presented by Milei to the electoral justice system have only been implemented in Argentina via military dictatorship, never through a bourgeois democracy. Argentinian bourgeois democracie has endured since 1983, a long time with no precedent in the country.

^[5] We already anticipate that this young party must continue to accumulate and build itself in the youth but it has to start looking more at what is happening in the working class. We must not make any constructive turns outside our laws, which are iron, but we must learn to look collectively more at the class.

^[6] We remind that the slogans “piquete y cacerola” with the small recovered factories, synthetized the independent social movement of the Argentinazo, although it always lacked the irruption of the organized working class. That is the whole strategic debate in Argentina, which the piqueterismo does not understand (that is, the PO who made a virtue of necessity does not understand it). PO means Workers’ Party with its initials in Spanish.

^[7]  See our articles on Brazil («An essay on Brazil’s political sociology», Izquierda Web).

^[8] About the democratic-peasant conquest of the peasanty in the Russian Revolution see “Methodological notes on forced collectivization”, Izquierda Web, by the same author of this note.

^[9] The fake freedom of Milei conjugates with the bourgeois individualism and self-emancipation of the authentic communist sense.

^[10] It is important to understand that none of the extreme right-wing forces, while still a great danger, are not traditional «fascist» formations: they have an important social base but mostly electoral politics, they do not have large organized shock forces, extra-parliamentary. This is another element not to be impressed in addition to having small provocative groups for which we will have to be prepared.

^[11] Attention that we were invited to go to the closing in TN and we consciously desisted. The purpose was not to expose our electoral figure (one of the most important of the left beyond the random result in votes) to unnecessary wear while maintaining the electoral closure «active» in order to speak (face-to-face). It escapes us because we cannot put all the elements in this report but the pandemic also has a lot to do with the Milei vote and the turn to the electoral right of the country.

^[12] Today it is crazy, but the PTS seems to be «waxy»: it yields to all the pressures of electoralism (we speak something of politics, not of dialogue with the masses, that is, of substance and not of form; we do not join the type of gorilla «without dialogue» of the PO).

^[13] We say this from the place of knowing that we have not yet passed an electoral campaign victoriously; that is, without yielding an inch to sectarianism.

^[14] We defend bourgeois democracy against Bonapartism although with the strategy of going to a proletarian dictatorship, a workers’ government (a democracy of a new type and a dictatorship of a new type, Lenin).

^[15] The case of Lenin and Trotsky in the Russian Revolution, neither more or less.

^[16] We already mentioned that, even confused or whatever, the vote to Milei is not simply “an angry vote”. It is a reactionary vote.